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Abstract 
 
It is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the 
present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve 
the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker 
maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that 
propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true 
nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative 
existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to 
truthmaker maximalism. In this paper, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach 
to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to presentism, all and only present entities exist. Presentism is opposed to 
eternalism, according to which past, present and future entities all exist. According to its 
defenders, presentism, unlike eternalism, captures our everyday intuitions about time. Indeed, 
this is taken to be one of the central motivating forces in favour of the view (Bigelow 1996, 
Kierland and Monton 2007, Markosian 2004, Merricks 2007, Tallant 2009b, Zimmerman 2008). 
However, as Jonathan Tallant (2009b) has recently pointed out, the claim that all and only 
present entities exist on its own does not do justice to those intuitions. For although one might 
commonly think that all and only present entities exist, one is also likely to believe that past 
entities existed and that future entities will exist. Thus, although we don’t think that dinosaurs exist 
– they are not out there in the universe some-when, wandering around, getting hit by meteors – we 
do believe that dinosaurs nevertheless existed. Furthermore, we think that only certain things 
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existed: although dinosaurs existed, vampires did not. Intuitively, there is a particular way that 
the past was.  
Given the importance that the presentist places on accommodating our intuitions about time, 
she has good reason to accommodate this further intuition about how things were and will be. 
But this seemingly innocuous intuition poses a substantial difficulty for presentism. The problem 
is that, in order to be able to accept the proposition <dinosaurs existed>, say, one must accept 
that <dinosaurs existed> is true. But according to truthmaker maximalism – an important part 
of standard truthmaker theory – for any true proposition P, there exists at least one entity E that 
makes P true, an entity in virtue of which P is true. (Armstrong 1997, Armstrong 2004). 1 
Consider for a moment the claim that Kripke exists. Kripke himself is the obvious candidate to 
answer the question ‘What makes <Kripke exists> true?’ But what makes <dinosaurs existed> 
true? It can’t be dinosaurs, since dinosaurs are nowhere to be found in the presentist’s ontology. 
But what then does the relevant truthmaking work?  
Call this the truthmaking question. As it stands, the truthmaking question is not yet an objection 
to presentism. In order to develop the truthmaking question into an objection, one requires the 
further claim that there is nothing available to the presentist that is capable of doing the relevant 
truthmaking work. With this claim in hand one can formulate a simple truthmaker objection 
against presentism as follows:2 
 
The Simple Truthmaker Objection against Presentism 
 
(P1) Truths about the past possess truthmakers.   [from Truthmaker 
Maximalism] 
(P2) If presentism is true, then truths about the past  
lack truthmakers.       [Assumption] 
(C1) Therefore, presentism is false.     [From P1 & P2] 
 
There are two ways to resist the simple objection. First, one might reject P1 by arguing that 
claims about the past simply do not possess truthmakers. If one takes this line, one must reject 
                                                 
1 Truthmaker maximalism is also defended by Cameron (2008) and by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) (who defends the 
view against Milne (2005)). The nature of the truthmaking relation between E and P is controversial; we remain 
officially neutral on the matter. 
2 The simple truthmaker objection focuses on claims about the past. We follow most parties to the debate in 
thinking that the past-directed form of the objection is the most pressing, but all of our comments apply equally to 
truths concerning the future. 
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the standard truthmaker theory offered above: the view according to which, for every truth there 
is at least one entity that makes that truth true. There are two options here, one radical and one 
modest. First, one might reject truthmaker theory tout court (and not just maximalism). On this 
view, there simply are no cases of truthmaking, not even between Kripke and <Kripke exists>. 
The connection between truth and reality is thereby severed. 
We think, however, that there are two good reasons not to proceed in this fashion. First, 
truthmaking provides a needed connection between true beliefs and ontology. If a belief such as 
the belief that there is a mind-independent external world is true, then there must be some mind-
independent thing that makes this belief true, namely, the external world. If, however, 
truthmaker theory is false, and true beliefs need not depend on what exists, then the belief that 
there is a mind-independent external world can be true, without there being anything whatsoever that 
makes this claim true. So for all we know, the external world does not exist, even though we 
believe truly that it does. Hence, by giving up truthmaker theory, one courts skepticism.  
Second, rejecting truthmaker theory tout court suggests that what’s true doesn’t depend on 
reality at all. But this seems to pose a problem even in non-skeptical cases. For example, if 
<Kripke exists> doesn’t depend on what exists for its truth, then its truth seems to be 
independent of the existence or non-existence of Kripke himself. We think, however, that it is 
obvious that the truth of <Kripke exists> depends on Kripke. 3  Indeed, that the truth of 
<Kripke exists> depends on Kripke possesses Moorean certainty: it is something that we know 
better than any philosopher’s argument to the contrary. Hence, the obviousness of this 
dependence performs an immediate reductio on any view that treats the truth of <Kripke exists> 
as independent of Kripke’s existence.  
The second and more modest option for rejecting P1 is to reject truthmaker maximalism, but 
without abandoning truthmaker theory altogether. Although most truths require truthmakers, 
truths about the past do not. While this option does not seem to pose any skeptical problems, 
this solution to the simple objection constitutes the hard road to presentism. The road is hard 
because, according to truthmaker theorists like Ross Cameron (2008), there is no plausible way 
to restrict truthmaker theory without rejecting truthmaker theory altogether: truthmaking is an 
all-or-nothing affair. So the presentist who takes this option has work to do: she must show that 
                                                 
3 When we say that the truth of <Kripke exists> depends on Kripke, we are not expressing the truism that <Kripke 
exists> iff Kripke exists, which is an instance of the Tarskian truth-schema. Nor are we saying <Kripke exists> 
because Kripke exists, if the ‘because’ connective is understood to relate propositions. Rather we are saying that there 
is some ontological dependence relation between the truth of <Kripke exists> and the world. It is the obviousness 
of that dependence relation that, we think, militates against rejecting truthmaker theory tout court. 
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truthmaker theory is not all-or-nothing by motivating and defending a restriction of the relevant 
kind.  
The second response to the simple truthmaker objection is to reject P2: even if presentism is 
true, it does not follow that claims about the past lack truthmakers. Indeed, according to this 
view, perfectly good truthmakers are on hand to make statements concerning the past true. For 
example, John Bigelow (1996) argues that there are presently instantiated, tensed world-
properties that can do this work; the property having once possessed dinosaurs, for instance, makes 
true the proposition <dinosaurs existed>. Alternatively, consider Tom Crisp’s (2007) ersatzer 
presentism (see also Bourne (2006a)). According to ersatzer presentism, the truthmakers for 
claims about the past are abstract entities: maximally consistent sets of tenseless propositions 
ordered by the E-relation - a successor relation over abstract objects, analogous to the earlier-
than relation that relates concrete times under eternalism. 
This second solution to the simple truthmaker objection is the easy road. The road is easy 
because it does not require restricting truthmaker theory. Rather, it takes truthmaker theory in its 
stride and accepts the challenge to provide truthmakers for claims about the past. The easy road 
is the road well-travelled (see, for example, Cameron (2011), Rhoda (2009) and Keller (2004)). 
Lately, however, the easy road has begun to look treacherous. In a recent series of papers David 
Sanson and Ben Caplan (2010, Caplan and Sanson 2011) argue that all extant forms of the easy 
road are explanatorily deficient. Tensed properties, abstract entities and so on do not adequately 
explain why it is that truths about the past are true. And, as David Liggins (2005) and Ian 
McFetridge (1990) have argued, there is good reason to suppose that truthmaking is (at least) 
constrained by explanation: what it is to make something true is, at least in part, to explain why 
it’s true. The Sanson and Caplan line effectively shuts down the easy road: on their view, the only 
entities capable of explaining why truths about the past are true are past entities. Hence, no form 
of the easy road can discharge the relevant explanatory burden, since no form of the easy road 
deploys past entities as the truthmakers for claims about the past.4 
The Sanson and Caplan critique is likely to push presentists down the hard road. Our goal, 
then, is to head presentists off at the pass by showing that hard road strategies fail to furnish the 
presentist with a solution to the truthmaker objection. It should be noted, however, that we are 
not concerned to show that it is impossible, in general, to motivate a restriction on truthmaker 
theory. Although we are sympathetic to this line of thought, establishing this claim would take us 
too far afield. Rather, our goal is the more modest one of showing that one cannot motivate the 
kind of restriction appealed to by hard road presentists to get presentism out of strife. In 
                                                 
4 Merricks (2007) and Baron (2012) use similar considerations to place pressure on easy road strategies.   
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pursuing this goal we will focus primarily on the hard road strategy of Jonathan Tallant (2009b, 
2009a), as it reflects the state of the art in hard road strategies, and because any form of the hard 
road is likely to proceed along similar lines. 
  
2. Milestones 
 
In his (2009b), Tallant employs a ‘partners in crime’ defense of presentist truthmaking by 
turning to the notorious case of negative existential truths, such as <there are no unicorns>. 
Two dominant strategies for handling negative existentials are: (A) positing entities such as 
negative facts to serve as truthmakers (see Russell (1919) and Armstrong (2004)) and (B) 
maintaining that negative existentials do not have truthmakers (see Bigelow (1988) and Lewis 
(2001, 1992)). Tallant suggests that presentists can avail themselves of either strategy. Presentists 
can posit the existence of ‘tensed facts’ that are no more worrisome than negative facts. Or they 
can maintain that truths about the non-present are just as good candidates for being truthmaker 
gaps (i.e., truths without truthmakers) as are negative existentials. 
The first of Tallant’s two options here is a form of the easy road, since it accepts the need to 
supply truthmakers for truths about the past, and so proceeds by capitulating to a suitably 
maximalist truthmaker theory. Although interesting, we will set Tallant’s defense of the easy road 
aside, for it appears to be undermined by Sanson and Caplan’s aforementioned concerns 
regarding explanation.5 
The second option is a hard road strategy because it places a twofold restriction on 
truthmaker theory, with regard to both negative existentials and truths about the past.6 There are 
thus three milestones along Tallant’s hard road. First, there is the claim that negative existentials 
lack truthmakers, which sets a principled precedent for restricting truthmaker theory. Second, 
                                                 
5 There are good reasons not to follow Tallant down his easy road. First, tensed facts do not seem to be good 
partners in crime with negative facts. For one thing, Armstrong only needs his one totality fact. A presentist who 
endorses tensed facts, however, will require an indefinite amount. Second, there are substantive questions facing 
presentism concerning the nature of tensed facts. What are tensed facts composed of? Because of the presentist’s 
thrifty ontology, tensed facts must be made up of either present entities or abstract entities. This will lead toward 
something like Bigelow’s tensed properties view or to Crisp’s ersatzer presentism. Thus, Tallant’s easy road will 
ultimately collapse into the standard easy road to presentism, which has been previously criticised by Sanson and 
Caplan. 
6 In principle, one need not develop the hard road via negative truths in this manner. One might argue for a 
restriction on claims about the past only, allowing that negative truths have truthmakers. Although one could take 
this line, no one in the literature has, and it is hard to see how one might motivate a restriction for claims about the 
past other than via an analogy to negative truths.  
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there is the claim that, because we can restrict in the case of negative existentials, we can restrict 
in the case of claims about the past as well. And third, Tallant offers new, restricted, truthmaking 
principles, which are supposed to accommodate truthmaker gaps with regard to both negative 
existentials and the past. Challenging each of these three claims provides an opportunity to block 
the hard road. In what follows, we consider each milestone in turn, and focus our criticisms on 
the latter two. 
 
3. Step One: Negative Existentials 
 
Why think that negative existentials lack truthmakers? Well, on standard truthmaker theory, 
when some object is a truthmaker for some proposition, the proposition is true in virtue of the 
existence of that object. <Penguins exist> is true in virtue of the existence of penguins. But a 
negative existential is a claim about what doesn’t exist. On the face of it, it’s true not in virtue of 
the existence of something of a particular kind, but in virtue of the fact that nothing of a 
different kind exists. In effect, the truthmaker maximalist demands that an ‘atheist’ about, say, 
unicorns, must ground her atheism with a ‘theism’ about something very different, such as an 
absence (Martin 1996), negative fact (Russell 1919), or totality state of affairs (Armstrong 2004). 
What’s hard to appreciate is how one might motivate the positing of absences, negative facts, or 
totality states of affairs independently of one’s theoretical commitment to maximalist truthmaker 
theory. Now, there might be good overall reasons for accepting maximalist truthmaker theory, 
biting the bullet, and countenancing objects like totality states of affairs. (This is the perspective 
that Armstrong (2004) takes.) In that case, the hard road is shut down early: if non-maximalist 
truthmaker theory is indefensible, then so too is the hard road to presentism. But the important 
point to notice is that the very idea of truthmaking— that existing objects make propositions 
true—might be seen as misplaced when applied to negative existentials, which are about what 
doesn’t exist. The hard road presentist needs to argue similarly: if we can motivate the idea that 
some truths, like negative existentials, lack truthmakers, then we begin to motivate the idea that 
truths about the past also lack truthmakers. 
In a recent paper, however, Cheyne and Pigden (2006) offer a straightforward position 
according to which negative existentials do, in fact, possess truthmakers and, moreover, that all 
the truthmaking work can be done with things that are already on hand. Thus, they contest the 
(albeit intuitive) idea that truthmaking is misplaced when it is applied to negative existentials. If 
their argument is successful, the hard road presentist will fail to reach the first milestone.  
To gain a sense of the Cheyne and Pigden line, consider the following proposition: 
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(1) <there is no hippopotamus in room S223> 
 
In order to make (1) true, argue Cheyne and Pigden, we require only a single, positive, 
truthmaker: the way that room S223 actually is on 01/02/12, since the way that room S223 
actually is on 01/02/12 (allegedly) guarantees the absence of a hippo in the room in question, and 
so the way that the room S223 actually is on 01/02/12 serves to guarantee the truth of (1). 
Cheyne and Pigden subsequently extend this idea to more general negative existentials, like: 
 
(2) <there are no unicorns> 
 
They contend that the correct truthmaker for (2) is the (first-order) way the universe actually is – 
which is a large, complex fact, but a positive fact for all that. As with the actual way that room 
S223 is, the way the actual world is (again, allegedly) guarantees that there are no unicorns and 
thus guarantees the truth of (2). (A similar view has been offered by Cameron (2008) and 
Schaffer (2010).)  
The advantage of the Cheyne and Pigden view is that, if it’s successful, we need no new 
ontology to make negative existentials true: no absences, totality facts or negative facts need 
apply. Rather, all the truthmaking is fixed by the positive way that the world actually is: a 
truthmaker which, presumably, we already have available. But more than this, it shows that 
truthmaking is not misplaced when it comes to negative existentials: if these facts guarantee the 
truths in question, then negative existentials are appropriate candidates for truthmaking after all 
– no restrictions are necessary. 
If Cheyne and Pigden are correct, then the first leg of the hard road to presentism is a dead 
end: we no longer have any reason to think that negative existential propositions lack 
truthmakers, and so no way to use negative existentials at the second leg to make a case for 
restricting truthmaker theory in the case of presentism. But, fortunately for the hard road 
presentist, there are two good reasons to doubt the complete success of the Cheyne and Pigden 
line.  
First, in a recent paper, Parsons (2006) identifies a serious difficulty for the idea that the world 
serves as the truthmaker for negative existentials like <there are no unicorns>. Parsons begins by 
differentiating between two different kinds of negative claims: partially general negative claims 
and fully general negative claims. Partially general negative claims, such as (1) above, posit the 
non-existence of a kind of entity within a limited region of space and/or time. Fully general 
negative claims are not restricted in this fashion, as in a claim like (2). This claim is fully general 
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in that it says that there are no unicorns simpliciter, not merely that there are no unicorns in this or 
that part of the universe. 
Parsons concedes that the Cheyne and Pigden strategy succeeds for partially general negative 
claims: once we fix the actual way that room S223 is at a particular time, we fix the fact that there 
is no hippo in that room at that time and so the actual way that room S223 is guarantees the 
truth of that claim. Similarly, Parsons admits that what we might call ‘specific negative 
predications’ like <Theaetetus is not flying> are amenable to the Cheyne and Pigden analysis; 
these are claims that apply a negative feature to a specific individual. Theaetetus himself, sitting 
as he is on the ground, guarantees the truth of <Theaetetus is not flying>. However, according 
to Parsons, the Cheyne and Pigden line fails for fully general negative claims like <there are no 
unicorns>. To illustrate this, Parsons offers the following example. Suppose that we take the 
actual universe and situate it within a broader reality in which it is but one of two island 
universes. Suppose that in our universe, universe A, unicorns do not exist, whilst in universe B 
they do. The (first-order) way that universe A actually is—whatever it is, in other words, that 
Cheyne and Pigden believe makes <there are no unicorns> true—still exists in the A-B universe. 
But <there are no unicorns> is false in the A-B universe. So Cheyne and Pigden’s offered 
truthmaker fails to guarantee the truth of <there are no unicorns>; they have yet to find 
truthmakers for fully general negative existentials. 
This brings us to the second reason to doubt the complete success of the Cheyne and Pigden 
line. Consider the partially general truth (1). According to Cheyne and Pigden, it is the actual way 
that room S223 is on 01/02/12 that guarantees the truth of that claim. As Armstrong (2006) 
argues, however, it is hard to see how this contingent, positive fact about room S223 might 
genuinely guarantee that there is no hippo in room S223. This becomes more evident when we 
substitute ‘the actual way that room S223 is on 01/02/12’ with the phrase ‘a certain collection of 
first-order positive states of affairs’. Put this way it is, in Armstrong’s words, ‘opaque’ as to why 
the actual way that room S223 is on 01/02/12 should guarantee the truth of (1). It is worth 
pointing out, however, that while Armstrong’s worry appears intuitively compelling for the cases 
of partially general negative truths (about which, it will be recalled, Parsons was relatively 
sanguine), it does not seem compelling for at least some specific negative truths, like <Theaetatus 
is not flying>. In this case, it does seem that Theaetatus’ sitting on the ground guarantees the 
truth of <Theaetatus is not flying>: every world in which Theaetatus is sitting on the ground is a 
world in which Theaetatus is not flying (cf. Veber (2008)).7    
                                                 
7 As an anonymous referee has pointed out to us, there is a further problem for the Cheyne and Pigden line. The 
actual way that room S223 is isn’t compossible with its containing a hippo, and that’s why the actual way that room 
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We think that these responses to Cheyne and Pigden are compelling (if not decisive) and, at 
the very least, provide a basis upon which to develop the first step along the hard road to 
presentism. But although Cheyne and Pigden’s strategy might fail for all negative truths, we think 
that the dialectic here is instructive, for the following reason. Parsons shows us that the Cheyne 
and Pigden line fails for fully general negative claims and Armstrong shows us that it fails for 
partially general negative claims. However, the Cheyne and Pigden line does enjoy some limited 
success when it comes to certain specific negative claims, such as negative predications. This will 
become important in what follows. For now it suffices to say that in order to dodge the 
objections from Cheyne and Pigden that challenge non-maximalist truthmaker theory, hard road 
presentists may avail themselves of the criticisms offered by Parsons and Armstrong.8 Of course, 
should these criticisms fail (and Cheyne and Pigden, or some other maximalist strategy, succeed), 
then hard road presentism is shut down. In what follows, we shall assume that this is not the 
case, and thus that we may continue exploring the hard road.  
 
4. Step Two: The Analogy 
 
Suppose one manages to motivate a restriction on truthmaking via negative existentials. In so 
doing, one must be wary of explosion: a situation where one’s restriction on truthmaking 
motivates truthmaking restrictions on all propositions, thereby undercutting truthmaker theory 
entirely. This would be problematic: as already discussed, no one should give up truthmaker 
theory tout court. If one is concerned to avoid explosive restrictions one cannot argue simply that 
because truthmaker theory can be restricted in the case of negative existentials, any restriction 
whatsoever is therefore acceptable. Rather, if one wishes to use the negative existential case to 
extend the restriction to a further domain of discourse, one must show that the claims in that 
discourse are analogous to negative existential propositions in important respects, and that is why 
                                                                                                                                                        
S223 is makes true <there are no hippos in room S223>. However, in order to spell this out, one must appeal to 
certain universal facts about room S223 such as <room S223 contains only air>. Since these universal facts are 
equivalent to negative existentials, the truthmaker for <there are no hippos in room S223> is not entirely positive. 
As with Armstrong’s worry, however, this difficulty does not seem to generalise to <Thaeatatus is not flying>. The 
truthmaker for this claim – namely, Thaetatus – can be spelled out without the need for universal propositions. In 
every world in which Thaeatatus is sitting on the ground, he is not flying, so his sitting on the ground (a positive fact) 
is not compossible with his flying.  
8 Although Armstrong criticises the Cheyne and Pigden line, he does not conclude against truthmaker maximalism, 
because he endorses the existence of totality facts. Nevertheless, the presentist might avail herself of Armstrong’s 
criticism of Cheyne and Pigden’s view without taking this further step, thereby opening up the hard road. 
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they need not possess truthmakers. For if they need not be analogous then it is hard to see how 
the path from negative existentials to the claims in the other discourse might be anything other 
than explosive.  
This applies to hard road presentism: in order to motivate a restriction on truthmaking in the 
case of truths about the past, such truths must be appropriately analogous to negative existentials. 
But presentists like Tallant have not yet told us in what respects claims about the past are 
analogous to negative existentials. What Tallant does instead is state what a non-maximalist 
presentist should say, and then attempts to explain away the felt need for truthmaking when it 
comes to propositions about the non-present. Tallant writes:  
 
‘If we look to the world, claims the presentist, we will find no existent entities to act as truth-
makers for talk about what was. Thus, because there are no existent entities that ‘truth-make’ 
past-tensed propositions so there can be no demand for truth-makers for past-tensed 
propositions’ (2009b: 414).  
 
This response, of course, is entirely question begging when offered to the eternalist. What is 
needed is some argument, independent of the debate between presentists and eternalists, for why 
truths about the non-present are appropriately analogous to negative existentials and thus do not 
require truthmakers. We offer three considerations that cast doubt on the availability of an 
argument of this kind.  
 
4.1 Logical Variety 
 
Recall our discussion of negative existentials in §3. As noted, there is good reason to suppose 
that partially general negative claims and fully general negative claims lack truthmakers. The 
presentist who opts for the hard road thus needs to establish an analogy between negative claims 
of this kind and truths about the past. However, many of the truths about the past that 
presentists are concerned to preserve are not partially general or fully general negative claims. In 
fact, presentists uphold the truth of all sorts of claims that run the gamut from general to specific, 
both positive and negative. For instance, all of the following are true: 
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<there were dinosaurs> [fully general, positive] 
<there have been no unicorns> [fully general, negative]9 
 
<there were dinosaurs on Earth> [partially general, positive] 
<there were no dinosaurs on Mars> [partially general, negative] 
 
<Socrates was a philosopher> [specific, positive] 
<Socrates was not a sophist> [specific, negative] 
 
The trouble is that hard road presentists need to establish that all of the truths about the past 
that are intuitively true are also relevantly similar to fully/partially general negative claims, if they 
are to defend the view that truths about the past systematically do not require truthmakers. But 
the truths about the past do not conform to one single logical form, and so the analogy is flawed. 
Indeed, it is flawed in two senses. First, many of the claims about the past that are intuitively 
true are disanalogous to fully general/partially general negative claims in terms of their scope. We 
have in mind here propositions like <Socrates was not a sophist>. If anything, this claim is 
analogous to specific negative predications like <Theaetatus is not flying>. But as discussed in §3, 
claims like <Theaetatus is not flying> have truthmakers. The truth of these claims is guaranteed 
by certain positive features of the world, such as Theaetatus’ sitting. So there is no way to move 
from a restriction on truthmaking for negative claims of this kind to claims with an analogous 
logical form about the past. 
Second, many claims about the past are not negative claims. When we say that <Socrates was 
a philosopher> is true, or <there were dinosaurs> is true we are saying something positive about 
the past. Hence, if anything, these claims are analogous to ordinary positive claims that possess 
truthmakers. Granted, these claims are analogous to negative claims in terms of their scope: 
<there were dinosaurs> is, for the presentist at least (see fn. 7), fully general, just like <there are 
no unicorns>. But it is because of the negativity of negative claims that a restriction to 
                                                 
9 It could be argued that <there were no dinosaurs> and <there have been no unicorns> are fully general with 
regard to space, but are only partially general with regard to time because they are restricted to the past. However, 
we take it that for the presentist these are fully general with respect to time, as are all claims, since there is only one 
moment of time if presentism is true. If, however, we are wrong and <there were no dinosaurs> is not fully general, 
then what we say below regarding the scope of that claim should be modified to say that <there were no dinosaurs> 
is analogous to <there are no unicorns on Earth>, in that it is a partially general claim. Even if this is correct, our 
point still stands: there is a disanalogy between positive claims about the past and negative claims about, say, 
unicorns. 
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maximalism is motivated, and so an analogy in scope is not enough on its own to motivate a 
truthmaker restriction for propositions about the past. 
In sum: the hard road presentist needs to establish that some negative existentials are 
plausibly taken to be truthmaker gaps, and thus may rely on either Armstrong’s10 or Parsons’ 
criticisms of Cheyne and Pigden’s defense of maximalism. But the space for non-maximalist 
truthmaker theory that these criticisms open up provides no helpful analogy for the presentist: 
the kinds of negative truths that plausibly lack truthmakers are not analogous to the wide variety 
of truths about the past.  
 
4.2 In the Fiction 
 
This brings us to the second reason for doubting the analogy between truths about the past 
and negative existentials. Consider a range of fictional propositions about the past, such as the 
proposition:  
 
(3) <vampires existed>.  
 
Now, compare (3) with (4): 
 
(4) <dinosaurs existed>. 
 
Presumably, (4) is true whilst (3) is false. Indeed, more generally, there must be a distinction 
between fictional claims about the past and non-fictional claims about the past along these lines. 
For if this distinction is not viable, and (3) and (4) share the same truth value, then there is no 
way to distinguish between the genuine history of the universe and some merely fictional history. 
But this is a distinction that one clearly can and should be able to make. For if one cannot make 
this distinction, then one has no basis for saying that although dinosaurs existed, vampires did 
not, and so no way to accommodate the intuition that there is a particular way that the past was, 
which is one of the central intuitions that all presentists must accommodate.  
But on what grounds might the presentist maintain that (4) is true whilst (3) is false? One 
obvious option is to hold that only (4) possesses a truthmaker, while (3) does not. This, however, 
is not a claim that the hard road presentist can hope to defend, since for them (4) lacks a 
truthmaker and is true nonetheless. Thus, if lacking a truthmaker were a reason to think that a 
                                                 
10 As above: although Armstrong criticizes Cheyne and Pigden’s view, he retains his commitment to maximalism. 
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proposition about the past is false, then that would cut just as badly against the truth of (4). 
Hence, for the hard roader some further reason is required for thinking that only (4) is true.  
Now, one might think that the matter is relatively straightforward: the distinction between (3) 
and (4) should be drawn where it appears to be, in the difference between the past and the 
fictional.11 But what is the difference between the past and the fictional? A reasonable proposal 
might be the following: past entities once possessed some positive ontological status, whereas 
fictional entities never possessed a positive ontological status. Thus, (3) is false because there 
never were any vampires and (4) is true because there really were dinosaurs. This suggestion, 
however, merely defers the problem; the proposed explanation presupposes the very distinction 
between the genuine history of the world and some merely fictional history for which we are 
trying to account. Specifically, dinosaurs once had a positive ontological status, whilst vampires 
did not, just in case (4*) is true and (3*) is false: 
 
(3*) <vampires once had a positive ontological status> 
(4*) <dinosaurs once had a positive ontological status> 
 
But now it would seem the problem recurs: on what grounds might the hard road presentist 
indict (3*) but not (4*)? It cannot be because (3*) lacks a truthmaker whilst (4*) does not because, 
again, lacking a truthmaker is no bar to being true when it comes to claims about the past. 
Moreover, it will not do to re-draw the distinction where it appears to lie, in terms of the 
distinction between what is past and what is fictional, and then use that distinction to show that 
(3*) is false whilst (4*) is true, because it is that very distinction that is now at stake. Rather, what 
the hard road presentist needs is a new way to draw the distinction between the past and the 
fictional, one that is not open to the same move.  
Can such a distinction be provided? We are doubtful. The trouble is that any condition one 
might place on dinosaurs over vampires such that dinosaurs are past whereas vampires are fictional 
will be a condition along the lines of (4*): a condition that says of a certain class of entities that 
they were thus and so. So there appears to be no way to draw the needed distinction except by 
stating the condition in a way that will require further claims about the past. One will then need a 
further reason to think that only claims of this sort about dinosaurs are true and thus that the 
condition holds in one case but not the other. Thus, the distinction one requires will always be 
deferred, and never drawn.  
                                                 
11 Our thanks go to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Of course, the worry simply does not arise if propositions about the past possess truthmakers. 
If propositions about the past possess truthmakers, then we can say that (4) is true whilst (3) is 
false, because (4) has a truthmaker whilst (3) does not, a condition that can be stated without the 
need for further claims about the past. Thus, it is only if one embraces the analogy between 
propositions about the past and negative existentials, thereby granting that propositions of the 
former kind also lack truthmakers, that one loses the distinction between fictional and non-
fictional claims about the past. Since we clearly can differentiate between these two kinds of 
claims there is therefore reason to doubt the viability of the analogy at issue. 
 
4.3 Dialectical Troubles 
 
Our third and final objection to the second stage of the hard road concerns the broad 
dialectic in which the presentist is engaged. Suppose that all negative existentials lack familiar, 
ontologically non-controversial truthmakers. In such a situation, the debate over negative 
existentials is between whether we should (i) posit a new kind of entity to satisfy standard 
truthmaker theory or (ii) argue that truthmaking ambitions are misplaced when it comes to 
negative existentials. Presentists like Tallant aim to make the case that these two paths are also 
open with respect to truths about the non-present, and let us grant that they are (supposing that 
the hard road presentist can meet the objections already offered). But there is a third option 
when it comes to truths about the past and future: we can (iii) posit familiar kinds of entities to 
satisfy maximalism. In other words, the eternalist need not face the parallel worry that 
truthmaker theorists face with respect to negative existentials. There is a happy alternative: what 
makes claims about the past and future true are exactly the same sorts of entities that make 
claims about the present true. Kripke makes true <Kripke exists>, and Socrates makes true 
<Socrates existed>. Whatever makes it true that the irises in the garden are blue is the same kind 
of thing that makes it true that the irises from last year’s garden were blue. Eternalists need not 
posit controversial “tensed” facts, nor need they rely on an analogy to negative existentials in 
order to free themselves from the demands of truthmaker theory.  
As a result, the truthmaking objection to presentism plays right into the hands of the 
eternalist. Even if the presentist has two available responses, the best response remains the 
eternalist one and so presentists who take the hard road have not, as yet, provided a way to 
deflect the truthmaker objection. Hence, the debate regarding truthmakers for negative truths is 
not sufficiently analogous to the debate regarding truthmakers for truths about the past. There 
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are dialectical options available in the latter debate that do not arise in the former. As a result, 
hard road presentists can find no shelter by turning to the debate over negative truths. 
 
5. Step Three: Weak Truthmaker Principles 
 
There is therefore cause for doubt concerning the second stage of the hard road to 
presentism. In this last section we will argue that even if one could make the analogy between 
negative existentials and claims about the past work, it is far from clear that there is a candidate, 
weakened truthmaker principle that will serve the needs of the hard road presentist. There 
appear to be just two such principles on offer. The first principle is offered by Tallant: 
 
(NGC-ST) ‘a proposition is true if and only if, either: (a) there exists an entity that 
makes that proposition true; or, (b) there does not exist an entity and that 
makes the proposition true; or, (c) there could have existed an entity that 
would make the proposition true; or, (d) there has existed an entity that 
makes the proposition true . . .’ (2009a, p. 426) 
 
(NGC-ST) is a non-starter. Take any contingently true negative existential, such as <there are no 
Arctic penguins>. Tallant takes such propositions to satisfy condition (b). But its negation, 
<there are Arctic penguins> satisfies condition (c), and so (NGC-ST) upholds the truth of both 
a proposition and its negation. (NGC-ST) is dead on arrival. 
In responding to Krämer (2010), who notices this same problem, Tallant acknowledges that 
this is ‘a bad result’ (2010, p. 503) and in its place offers: 
 
(CGP) ‘For every proposition, that proposition is true iff it accurately characterizes its 
subject matter.’ 
 
As a replacement truthmaking principle, (CGP) has little to offer. To say that a proposition 
‘accurately characterizes its subject matter’ is no more than a roundabout way of saying that a 
proposition is true. Tallant’s own examples of the principle bear this out: <there were dinosaurs> 
accurately characterizes the world, he says, if and only if dinosaurs have existed. (‘there were 
dinosaurs’ and ‘dinosaurs have existed’, it goes without saying, are two ways of saying the same 
thing.) So (CGP) is, in fact, nothing more than a statement of the propositional truth schema: 
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For every proposition <p>, <p> is true iff p. 
 
Hence, (CGP) is not a truthmaking principle at all. It merely points to the same set of 
equivalences that, according to Tarski (1956), every adequate theory of truth must entail.12 But 
these equivalences are neither here nor there when it comes to accounting for the sort of 
dependence at issue in truthmaker theory. If they were, then everyone would, quite trivially, be a 
truthmaker maximalist. For if all there is to a proposition’s ‘having a truthmaker’ is there being 
some sentence materially equivalent to ‘<p> is true’, then every proposition (or, at least, every 
proposition we can name) has a truthmaker. Alternatively, if upholding the truth schema is all 
there is to capturing the insight behind truthmaking, then there is nothing to motivate the 
ontological debates that fuel truthmaker theory. Do all truths have truthmakers, or are there 
truthmaker gaps? Are states of affairs required to serve as truthmakers, or do tropes suffice? 
What is the nature of the dependence between a truth and its truthmaker(s)? Such questions 
disappear if everything there is to say about truthmaking can be captured by (CGP).13 
(CGP), then, is not a plausible reformulation of (NGC-ST). Is there a more plausible way to 
redevelop that principle? One option might be to appeal to the supervenience version of 
truthmaking defended by John Bigelow (1988) and David Lewis (2001). The supervenience view 
does not contend that for every truth, there must exist a truthmaker. Rather, this truthmaker 
principle requires only that the truth of a proposition supervenes on what exists. Following Lewis, 
we state this truthmaker principle as follows:  
 
The Supervenience Principle (SP): ‘For any proposition P and any worlds W and V, if P 
is true in W but not in V, then either something exists in one of the worlds but not in the 
other, or else some n-tuple of things stands in some fundamental relation in one of the 
worlds but not in the other.’ (Lewis 2001, p. 612).14 
 
                                                 
12 Technically, Tarski’s requirement involved sentential versions of the schema, not propositional ones: ‘p’ is true iff 
p. 
13 To push this point further, consider that all parties to the debate agree that <there are no unicorns> is true iff 
there are no unicorns. But that in no way settles the contentious question about what, if anything, exists that makes 
it true. 
14 As Lewis notes, this formulation of the supervenience principle is weaker than Bigelow’s formulation. Bigelow’s 
principle is formulated without the second disjunct. Thus, for Bigelow, all that the supervenience principle requires 
is that for any proposition P and any worlds W and V, if P is true in W but not in V, then something exists in one 
of the worlds but not the other. 
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It is commonly agreed that SP avoids the need to provide truthmakers for negative existential 
propositions. As Lewis writes: 
 
‘[SP] allows truths to have truthmakers, but also it allows them to be true just because 
they lack falsemakers. The simplest case is that of a negative existential: the proposition 
that there are no unicorns, say. It is true in the actual world just because there are no 
unicorns to make it false. In any world where it is false, certain things would have to exist 
which in actuality do not exist, namely one or more unicorns.’ (Lewis 2001, p. 610) 
 
If Lewis is correct then one might argue as follows: if negative existentials can be true because of 
how things are not under (SP) without committing to any truthmakers, then perhaps claims about 
the past can be true because of how things were without committing to any truthmakers. (SP), it 
could be argued, leaves this entirely open, and so a principle of this kind might be well-
positioned to serve the hard road presentist’s need for a principle that eschews truthmakers for 
claims about the past. Thus, Tallant might fruitfully reformulate (NGC-ST) by combining it with 
something like (SP), to produce the following tensed account of truthmaking: 
 
The Supervenience Principle* (SP*): For any proposition P and any worlds W and V, if P 
is true in W but not in V, then either something exists, existed or will exist in one of the 
worlds but not in the other, or else some n-tuple of things stands, stood or will stand in 
some fundamental relation in one of the worlds but not in the other.  
 
The idea behind (SP*) is to widen the supervenience base for propositions.15 Propositions no 
longer supervene merely on what exists. Rather, propositions supervene on what exists and what 
existed (and will exist). Thus propositions can be true in virtue of how things were, which appears 
to capture condition (d) of (NGC-ST) in a more plausible form. By widening the supervenience 
base in this fashion, the hard road presentist avoids the need to provide truthmakers for claims 
about the past: just as negative existential propositions can be true because of the lack of false-
makers, propositions about the past can be true in virtue of what merely existed.  
There is, however, a serious difficulty with (SP*). According to (SP*), the truth of 
propositions about the past supervenes on what existed. But what existed, according to the 
presentist, does not (ordinarily) exist. So propositions about the past supervene on what does not 
exist. Supervenience is, however, a relation: if a supervenes on b then that is in virtue of some 
                                                 
15 Again, our thanks go to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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supervenience relation R such that aRb. Consequently, if the truth of propositions concerning 
the past supervenes on what existed (but does not exist), then there must exist cross-temporal 
supervenience relations that have as their relata entities that merely existed (but do not exist).  
However, most presentists deny the existence of relations of this kind because most 
presentists are serious presentists, where serious presentism is the view according to which past 
entities – entities that existed – do not possess properties or stand in relations (Bergmann 1999, 
pp. 125–126, Markosian 2004, p. 52, Hinchliff 1996, pp. 124–126 ). This form of presentism (at 
least with regard to relations) is motivated by a commitment to the intuitive idea that all relations 
are existence entailing (which Crisp (2005, p. 5) claims is a ‘truism’), where a relation N is 
existence entailing iff necessarily, xNy only if x and y exist (Bigelow 1996, p. 37).  
Commitment to (SP*) therefore requires rejecting existence entailment and, with it, serious 
presentism. It is commonly thought, however, that the rejection of serious presentism leads to an 
unattractive Meinongian metaphysics (see, for instance, Brogaard (2006, p. 195), Bergmann 
(1999) and Markosian (2004, p. 52)), according to which there are past things that instantiate 
fundamental properties and serve as the relata in cross-temporal relations, though they do not 
exist. Presentists, however, are not generally willing to adopt Meinongianism with regard to the 
past for the simple reason that once one has bought into Meinongianism with regard to non-
present things, there no longer appears to be any clear distinction between presentism and non-
presentism to be drawn (Keller 2004, pp. 89–91, Lewis 2004a, pp. 7–11), and certainly no clear 
motivation for endorsing one view over the other. (Nor is it clear why the Meinongian strategy 
would not simply collapse into the easy road, for it appears that Meinongian objects could serve 
as truthmakers for claims about the past.) 
Now, one might disagree with this objection against (SP*) on the following grounds: if the 
supervenience needed for (SP*) requires relations, then the supervenience needed for (SP) 
requires relations also. But this means contra Lewis that (SP) cannot be used to handle the truth 
of negative existential claims. For a similar problem can be raised there: the truth of <there are 
no unicorns> under (SP) supervenes on what is not rather than what exists. But supervenience 
requires relations and all relations are existence entailing. So it seems we must be committed to 
the existence of things that are not. Such things, however, can only be absences of some kind. 
But this result flatly contradicts what Lewis says, namely that (SP) enables one to accommodate 
the truth of negative existential claims without committing to the existence of absences. 
However, it is somewhat misleading to say that, given (SP), negative existentials supervene on 
what is not, at least if this is taken to mean that negative existential do not supervene on what 
exists. It is clear, rather, that for Lewis negative existentials that obey (SP) supervene on what 
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exists; what it means for a negative existential proposition P to obey (SP) is just that if P is true at 
a world W and false at a world V, then there is something that exists at W and not at V or vice 
versa. So, for example, consider <there are no unicorns>. This proposition obeys (SP) in the 
sense that if that proposition is true at a world W and false at a world V, then unicorns exist at 
V but not at W. It is not the case, however, that the truth of <there are no unicorns> thereby 
supervenes on what is not and thus requires the reification of the absence of unicorns. Rather, the 
truth of that proposition supervenes on the ontology of the world, in the sense that if you make 
a difference to the truth of <there are no unicorns> then you must make a difference to the 
ontology. The supervenience relation is always connecting things that exist, even in the case of 
negative existentials. 
These considerations do not extend to (SP*): it is not the case that propositions about the past 
supervene on the ontology of the world. To see this, consider the proposition <dinosaurs 
existed>. Suppose that this proposition is true at a presentist world W and false at a presentist 
world V. On the face of it, this difference in truth value makes no difference to the ontology of the 
worlds: a presentist world in which <dinosaurs existed> is true and a world in which <dinosaurs 
existed> is false might nevertheless be the same in all relevant ontological respects. Indeed, if a 
change to the truth-value of <dinosaurs existed> between W and V did make a difference to the 
ontology of the two worlds, then some account would be required of exactly what that difference 
might be. Now, it cannot be a difference in dinosaurs, because dinosaurs (we can assume) do not 
exist in either world. So there must be some further difference in the ontology that accounts for 
the difference in truth.  
The challenge for the presentist who accepts (SP*) and who wishes to retain serious 
presentism is to spell out exactly what this difference might be. The presentist of this kind must 
now add something to the ontology that can serve as the supervenience base for the truth of 
<dinosaurs existed>. However, this has all the hallmarks – and troubles – of the easy road to 
presentism. Thus, assuming that the hard road presentist wants to stay on the hard road at this 
juncture, she must accept that propositions about the past, unlike negative existentials, do not 
supervene on what exists but, rather, supervene on what existed which, as we have argued, 
requires relations to non-existent entities. 
(SP*) then does not appear capable of serving the hard road presentist’s needs: if propositions 
about the past satisfy (SP*), then that is either because one thinks that non-existent entities can 
serve as the relata in cross-time relations or because one is presupposing some form of the easy 
road to presentism. Neither option looks attractive. The failure of (SP*) is, however, instructive. 
(SP*) fails, it would seem, for the following reason: although it avoids the need to provide 
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truthmakers for claims about the past, it does not avoid the need to elucidate the demands that 
propositions about the past place on ontology. Because propositions about the past supervene 
on what existed, some account must be given of the relevant supervenience base and thus how 
the associated supervenience operates, given that the past does not exist.  
What the proponent of the hard road needs then is something even weaker than (SP*): what 
she needs is a principle of truthmaking that allows propositions about the past to be true whilst 
making no demands on ontology at all. To formulate such a principle one would need to narrow 
the supervening top, as opposed to widening the supervening base (which is how (SP*) 
operates). This would give us something like: 
 
The Supervenience Principle` (SP`): Only the truth of propositions about the present 
supervenes on what exists. 
 
(SP`) is exhaustive: the only truths that depend on what exists are truths about the present. 
Truths about the past float free of ontology. 
That the hard road presentist requires (SP`) shows us exactly what kind of restriction on 
truthmaking she requires in order to get off the easy road. It is not enough for the hard road 
presentist to merely restrict truthmaker maximalism by claiming that propositions about the past 
lack truthmakers. Rather, the hard road presentist must restrict maximalism by showing that 
propositions about the past do not depend for their truth on ontology in any sense. As a result, 
we can see that the non-maximalism inherent to hard road presentism is far more radical than is 
Lewis’s and Bigelow’s non-maximalism about negative existentials. This difference brings into 
focus the true shape of the hard road to presentism. The hard road, if it is to succeed, must 
proceed as follows. First, one must show that negative existential claims motivate a restriction on 
truthmaker theory in the above sense: specifically, the truth of such claims does not depend on the 
ontology. Second, one must show that claims about the past are just like negative existentials in 
this respect and, third, one must endorse a weakened truthmaker principle that accommodates 
‘gaps’ of this rather more severe kind, such as (SP`). 
If that is the shape of the hard road, however, then it is a road to nowhere. First, although 
one might well adopt a weakened truthmaking principle like (SP`), no presentist has to date. 
Perhaps there is a reason for this: by weakening (SP) any further one runs the risk of leaving the 
relationship between truth and being far too unconstrained, thereby inviting skepticism once 
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more. But if one is willing to do that, then one may as well simply give up on truthmaking 
altogether.16  
Second, and more importantly, the first step along the true hard road appears seriously flawed. 
The first step is to show that the truth of negative existential propositions does not depend on 
the ontology. This appears difficult, however, because (as already discussed) the truth of such 
claims clearly does depend on the ontology: a change in the truth value of a negative existential 
corresponds to a change in the ontology of the world. If <there are no unicorns> is true at a 
world W and false at a world V, then there must be unicorns at V but not at W, and so there 
must be at least this difference between the two worlds. Hence, at the very least, such claims 
supervene on the ontology.  
So the first step on what we might call the ‘true’ hard road to presentism is in trouble: even if 
negative existentials lack truthmakers, their truth nevertheless depends on the ontology.  Hence, 
there is no way to use negative existentials at the second step to make a case for restricting 
truthmaker theory in the case of presentism, which requires showing that claims about the past 
make no demands on ontology at all.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The hard road to presentism is, indeed, hard. In order to pursue the hard road, one must try 
to show that claims about the past lack truthmakers. Current hard road strategies pursue this goal 
via three stages. First, by arguing that negative existentials lack truthmakers; second, by arguing 
that claims about the past are just like negative existentials in this regard; and, third, by adopting 
a weakened truthmaker principle which lets the presentist off the hook when it comes to 
providing truthmakers for claims about the past. We first argued against the second stage: one 
cannot argue from a restriction on negative existentials to a restriction on claims about the past 
because the two cases are not analogous.  
When considering the third stage, however, we revealed a far deeper problem for the hard 
road. Once the hard road is properly understood, it is clear that its success depends upon 
showing that claims about the past make no demands on ontology, since any such demands will 
force the presentist to elucidate what those demands are, which will force her back down the 
easy road. What we have called the true hard road, then, requires motivating this more severe 
restriction on truthmaker theory. This restriction, however, cannot proceed via negative 
existentials, because such claims clearly do make demands on the ontology, at least in the 
                                                 
16 Keller (2004, pp. 91–93) considers and rejects a weakened form of (SP) along these lines. 
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relatively weak sense of supervenience. Thus, we conclude against the hard road. Since the easy 
road appears to have been previously closed by Sanson and Caplan we therefore conclude 
against presentism on the grounds that it cannot do what it needs to do, namely, accommodate 
the truth of claims concerning the past in order to satisfy our intuitions about time.17  
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